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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did the trial court err in entering a protective order where the trial 
court's findings had no supporting evidentiary basis? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's factual findings are entitled to 
deference while whether the trial court properly entered a protective order presents a 
question of law. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, 52 P.3d 1158. 
ISSUE PRESERVED: Respondent preserved his objection to the entry of the 
protective order in the Record at pages 18-21, 38-41, 58-59, 72. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(h). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-7-101, et seq. The relevant portions of this Act are set forth 
verbatim in the attached Addendum. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the entry of a protective order in favor of petitioner and 
against respondent. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court had a proper 
evidentiary basis on which to enter the protective order. This action is collateral to the 
parties' divorce proceeding. 
Facts 
On July 29, 2008, respondent was served with a Request for Protective Order. 
(R.at 8-10, 11-14) In paragraph 4(e) of her petition for a protective order, petitioner 
alleges that on July 24, 2008 respondent told her that if she knew what was good for her 
she would keep her doors locked (paragraph 4(e) also contains others allegations that the 
Court considered as allegations of past threatened abuse). (R. at 2) After entry of an ex 
parte protective order, the court set a hearing to determine whether to make the protective 
order permanent. At the August 12, 2008 hearing, respondent's counsel proffered 
respondent's testimony that on July 24, 2008, during the conversation respondent had 
with petitioner, there was no yelling and there were no threats during that conversation. 
(R. at 59) At the August 12, 2008 hearing, respondent's counsel proffered respondent's 
testimony that respondent denied that he ever threatened petitioner. (R. at 59) 
Notwithstanding respondent's unequivocal denial, the Commissioner's basis for 
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recommending the protective order was that respondent failed to deny petitioner's 
allegation from July 24, 2008. (R. at 60) 
Respondent objected to the entry of the protective order and requested the trial 
court judge to review the Commissioner's recommendation to enter the protective order. 
(R. at 18-21) The trial court judge agreed with respondent's argument; however, the trial 
court viewed the "totality" of the allegations and determined the allegations were 
sufficient to warrant the entry of a protective order. (R. at 72, p. 13) In this review, the 
trial court did not receive any evidence. (R. at 72) Furthermore, the trial court did not 
allow respondent the opportunity to put on evidence regarding the alternate basis it relied 
to issue the protective order. (R. at 72) In short, the trial court's entry of a protective 
order was based on alternative grounds, not supported by any admissible evidence. (R. at 
72) Respondent timely appeals whether the trial court properly entered a protective order 
based only on unsworn and unsubstantiated allegations. (R. at 67-69) 
Procedural Details of Case and Disposition of the case below 
Petitioner requested and was granted an ex parte protective order on July 28, 
2008. Respondent was served with the ex parte order on July 29, 2008. Pursuant to the 
statutory requirement, a hearing was held before a Commissioner to determine whether 
the protective order should be made permanent. This hearing was held on August 12, 
2008. At this hearing, the parties proffered limited evidence. The Commissioner 
specifically agreed that much of the evidence was not admissible to support the entry of 
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the protective order. The Commissioner, however, relied on one incident to support her 
recommendation that the protective order be made permanent. 
Respondent objected to the Commissioner's recommendation on the grounds 
that the Commissioner's expressed finding was inconsistent with the evidence proffered 
at the hearing. Respondent requested a hearing before the trial court judge on his 
objection. Absent the disputed testimony, respondent argued that the Commissioner 
lacked an evidentiary basis for the entry of the protective order. 
Although the trial court agreed that the Commissioner's finding was incorrect 
and insufficient, the trial court examined the totality of the allegations in the petition and 
determined that the protective order should be made permanent. The trial court did not 
request petitioner to put on any evidence to support the allegations in the petition. In 
addition, respondent was given no opportunity to cross-examine petitioner or to put on 
any evidence of his own. Based on the evidentiary deficiencies, respondent appealed the 
trial court's entry of a permanent protective order. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred when it issued a permanent protective order on alternative 
grounds that were not supported by any evidence in the Record. Furthermore, the trial 
court failed to comply with the statutory requirements when it did not allow respondent a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard before entering a permanent protective order. The 
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trial court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing in which respondent was 
allowed to hear the allegations, cross-examine the witnesses on the allegations, and 
present evidence to rebut the allegations. Because respondent was not provided this 
opportunity and because the trial court did not have any admissible evidence to support 
its findings, the issuance of a permanent protective order was error. As such, the 
permanent protective order should be vacated, or at a minimum, an evidentiary hearing 
should be conducted. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Commissioner erred in finding that respondent had failed to deny the 
only allegation that petitioner offered in support of her petition for a 
protective order. 
In her petition for a protective order, petitioner offered three sets of allegations 
against respondent. First, petitioner made reference to a series of allegations that were 
the subject of a prior order. (R. at 2, TJ4.e.) The parties stipulated to the dismissal of this 
prior order as part of their divorce proceedings. (R. at 58-59) Second, petitioner made 
reference to statements made by the parties' son. (R. at 2, ^[4.b. & e.) Finally, petitioner 
offered one new incident of a direct threat made on July 24, 2008. (R. at 2, [^4.a. & e.) 
None of these allegations, however, were based on admissible evidence, and therefore, 
were insufficient to support the entry of the protective order. 
The prior allegations of threats were the subject of a prior order, and the parties 
stipulated dismissal of the prior order. (R. at 58-59, 60) Specifically, the Commissioner 
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made the following finding: *cIt is agreed by both counsel that the parties previously had 
stipulated in a protective order to have that dismissed and to have restraining orders pit in 
the divorce case." (R. at 60) Accordingly, these allegations could not be part of the 
petition for a protective order that is at issue in this case. Moreover, petitioner offered no 
evidence to support these past allegations, and respondent timely objected to these 
statements being considered at the hearing before the Commissioner. (R. at 56-59) 
Accordingly, the Commissioner noted that the parties had stipulated to the dismissal of 
the past protective order, and the Commissioner's ruling did not address any of the prior 
allegations as a basis for entering the protective order. (R. at 60) 
Next, the allegations made by the parties' son were inadmissible hearsay. 
Respondent objected to this evidence in the hearing before the Commissioner. (R. at 58) 
In a similar case where a party attempted to introduce a videotape of a child's testimony, 
this Court had substantial concerns about whether it was admissible hearsay. See N.D. v. 
A.B., 2003 UT App 215, 73 P.3d 97. In N.D., the trial court made substantial findings 
regarding the admissibility of a child's out-of-court statements, and this Court concluded 
the trial court had erred in admitting the statements as evidence. See id. at ^f 17-21. 
In this case, respondent timely objected to his son's statements. The 
Commissioner made no findings that the child's out-of-court statements were admissible. 
(R. at 58-61) Absent the detailed findings necessary to admit these statements, it would 
be error for the Commissioner to consider these statements as grounds for entry of the 
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protective order. Nothing in the Commissioner's ruling, however, suggested that the 
child's statements were a basis for entering the protective order. Specifically, the 
Commissioner stated: "Since that time, Ms. Hedgcock outlined concerns with regards to 
her own physical safety, agreeing with Mr. Harris that the statement with regard to the 
child was not made directly to Ms. Hedgcock and without a guardian ad litem, we cannot 
be clear exactly as to what the child said and what the child may have witnessed . . . ." 
(R. at 60.) 
After noting that neither the prior allegations nor the child's statement were 
admissible grounds for the protective order, the Commissioner went on to state: ". . . but 
there is a statement after the entry of the stipulation. That statement was on 07/24/2008, 
where the respondent made a statement to the petitioner that I believe was intended to be 
a threat. He has not denied that during the course of this hearing, that the statement was 
made but he does state that all the allegations previously should not be the basis of the 
protective order." (R. at 60 (emphasis added)). Thus, the Commissioner made clear that 
she was entering the protective order on the basis of the alleged threat made on July 24, 
2008. Furthermore, the Commissioner stated that respondent had not denied this 
allegation. (R. at 60) Thus, based on the one allegation on July 24, 2008 and the 
Commissioner's erroneous conclusion that respondent had not denied the allegation, the 
Commissioner entered the protective order. 
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In fact, respondent did deny the allegation at the hearing before the Commissioner. 
(R. at 59) At the hearing, respondent proffered the following denial of the allegation: 
''July 24th, the day before Ms. Hedgcock took out this protective order, the parties had a 
45-minute conversation on the phone. They talked about several issues. They talked 
about getting back together. They talked about care of the children, but there were no 
yelling, there were no threats during that conversation. What Mr. Hedgcock did say was 
that he believed that the boyfriend was abusing the children and the next day he was 
going down to protective services and get the kids put in State custody. That's what he 
told her. And the next morning, he did that." (R. at 59 (emphasis added)). 
In addition to denying petitioner's allegation, respondent proffered additional 
evidence regarding the parties' contact during the time of the alleged threat. Respondent 
offered evidence which suggested that petitioner did not believe she was in imminent 
danger of physical harm. In fact, petitioner and respondent had almost daily contact and 
discussions regarding visitation and child care issues. (R. at 59) In contrast to petitioner's 
bare and unsubstantiated allegation of a physical threat, respondent provided a detailed 
series of dates, conversations, and text messages. (R. at 59) All of which occurred after 
the date of the alleged physical threat when petitioner alleged she was in fear of imminent 
physical harm. Far from failing to deny the allegation, respondent unequivocally denied 
the allegation and offered compelling rebuttal evidence. Thus, the Commissioner's 
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reliance on this one incident and her erroneous conclusion that respondent failed to deny 
the allegation was error. 
II. The trial court erred when it relied on other allegations only contained in the 
petition but not supported by any evidentiary basis. 
Based on the admissible evidence before it, the trial court erred when it entered the 
protective order based on the "totality" of the allegations. In N.D., this Court declined to 
consider the excluded hearsay evidence in determining whether sufficient evidence 
existed to enter a protective order. See N.D., 2003 UT App 215 at ^[23. Specifically, this 
Court stated: "we do not consider the trial court's findings based upon [the excluded 
evidence] in our review of its decision to issue the protective order. As a result, we are 
left with the remainder of the trial court's findings from the relevant portion of its ruling 
as the basis for its decision to issue the protective order." Id. 
In this case, respondent objected to the Commissioner's granting of the ex parte 
protective order and requested a hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-7-107. 
Respondent argued that the Commissioner erred in her conclusion that respondent had 
failed to deny the alleged threat on July 24, 2008. (R. at 18-21) At the hearing, before the 
trial court respondent argued: "The crux of my argument, your Honor, is that there 
wasn't sufficient evidence to enter the protective order to begin with. One self-serving 
statement made by one party that denied by the other is simply not sufficient to enter a 
protective order." (R. at 72, p. 11) 
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In affirming the entry of the protective order, the trial court agreed with 
respondent's argument that he denied the allegation, but then it entered the protective 
order on a different basis than the Commissioner recommended. (R. at 72, p. 13) The 
trial court's finding in support of the protective order was as follows: "I'm going to deny 
the motion to dismiss the protective order. And let me tell you why, there's one area in 
which I disagree with the Commissioner, that area is, I believe that I can look at the 
totality of the petition to determine whether or not there is sufficient evidence to enter a 
protective order and—and so, I—I believe that I don't need to just look at one statement 
in isolation, which has been denied. I believe that I can look at all of the allegations that 
are in the petition to determine whether or not there is a sufficient basis for that protective 
order to enter." (R. at 72, p. 13) In summary, the trial court stated: "And so, in looking 
at all of the allegations, I find that the Commissioner did not make an error and entered 
an appropriate recommendation, albeit on a different basis than I find." (R. at 72, p. 13 
(emphasis added)). 
The Commissioner, however, did not receive any competent or admissible 
evidence to warrant the entry of a protective order by the trial court on an alternative 
basis. While the facial allegations in a petition for a protective order may be sufficient 
for entry of an ex parte protective order, those allegations in a petition are insufficient for 
entry of a permanent protective order after a hearing. In other words, petitioner was 
required to put on competent and admissible evidence in the hearing in order to warrant 
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the entry of a permanent protective order. In this case, petitioner proffered evidence 
regarding the July 24th threat at the hearing before the Commissioner. The Commissioner 
improperly relied on this evidence because it mistakenly found that respondent had failed 
to deny the allegation. 
The trial court properly recognized the July 24th threat was disputed and was not 
satisfied that this "isolated" statement was proper grounds. In going beyond this incident, 
however, the trial court necessarily relied on other grounds that were not supported by 
any evidence submitted to the Commissioner. Specifically, the petition for a protective 
order referenced the testimony from the son. Respondent objected to this evidence as 
hearsay, and the Commissioner also noted the inherent limitations of this allegation. (R. 
at 58-61.) The remaining allegations were the subject of a prior order that the parties 
agreed could be dismissed. Moreover, petitioner did not proffer or offer any of this 
evidence to the Commissioner or the trial court. Respondent was not given any 
opportunity to cross-examine the petitioner with respect to these allegations. Respondent 
did deny the allegations and offered compelling evidence to the Commissioner to 
contradict these alleged events and to contradict that petitioner was in fear of imminent 
physical harm. 
In this case, the trial court was presumably relying on the past allegations as the 
"totality" of the allegations in the petition. Those past allegations, however, were as 
much as two years earlier and had no corroborating evidence. In N.D., this Court 
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examined a lone event that was several years prior to the allegations in the petition for a 
protective order and concluded: the [earlier event], even if proven to have occurred, was 
too remote in time to [petitioner's] filing of the petition for the protective order to be a 
sufficient basis for the trial court's conclusion under section 30-6-2(1)." N.D., 2003 UT 
App215at^25. 
In this case, the trial court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing if it was 
going to rely on an alternative basis for entering the protective order. The Commissioner 
only received proffered evidence about the July 24, 2008 alleged incident. Because the 
trial court agreed with respondent's objection to this alleged incident and whether it was a 
sufficient basis for entering a protective order, the trial court was left with no other 
evidence on which to enter the protective order. Indeed, the trial court's findings only to 
reference the totality of the circumstances as set forth in the petition. The findings are 
not tied to any admitted evidence. The trial court was within its right to examine other 
possible bases, but those bases had to be supported by admissible evidence. The 
unsupported allegations of the petition were not sufficient and do not amount to 
competent or admissible evidence. Furthermore, the trial court had to allow respondent 
the opportunity to be heard on the alternative basis. Respondent was not provided 
opportunity to hear the petitioner's testimony on the alleged other incidents, was not 
given an opportunity to cross-examine the petitioner on these events, and was not 
afforded an opportunity to put on his own evidence to rebut the alleged incidents. 
12 
In the end, the trial court's decision to enter the protective order was deficient 
because the trial court did not have an adequate evidentiary basis and because the 
respondent was denied his due process right to confront his accuser and put on his own 
evidence. The trial court agreed that the Commissioner had erred in her conclusions, but 
the trial court was still concerned about the allegations. At this point, the trial court 
should have requested the parties put on evidence on the alternative allegations. Instead, 
the trial court relied on the unsubstantiated allegations in the petition as the basis for the 
protective order. This was error. 
III. Unsubstantiated allegations in a petition are not a sufficient evidentiary basis 
for entry of a protective order. 
The trial court's findings to support its conclusion that a permanent protective 
order should be entered reference only the totality of the allegations in the petition. The 
allegations in the petition are sufficient only for entry of the ex parte order. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-7-106. The statute contemplates the issuance of a temporary order 
based on the facial validity of the allegations of the petition. See id. After the entry of 
the ex parte temporary protective order, the statute mandates a hearing within 20 days in 
order to determine whether the temporary order should be made permanent. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-7-107. The requirement for a hearing before issuing a permanent order 
is to allow the respondent the opportunity to be heard on the matter. See id. 
In order to be meaningful, the opportunity to be heard must allow, at a 
minimum, the opportunity to hear the allegations, to cross-examine the witnesses 
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concerning the allegations, and to put on rebuttal evidence. If facial allegations of the 
petition were sufficient without any supporting and admissible evidentiary basis, the 
statute would not need to require a hearing with an opportunity for the respondent to be 
heard. Accordingly, the trial court's action in affirming on the allegations in the petition 
rather than the proffered evidence did not comply with the statutory requirements. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing facts and authorities, respondent requests this Court to 
vacate the permanent protective order on the basis that the order is not supported by any 
admissible evidence. In the alternative, this Court should remand this matter back to the 
trial court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing. At this hearing, petitioner 
must present her evidence to support the permanent protective order, and respondent 
must be provided the opportunity to cross-examine the petitioner and her witnesses and 
be allowed to present any rebuttal evidence. After hearing this evidence, the trial court 
should decide whether the protective order should continue, including any findings for or 
against continuing the protective order. 
DATED this / day of March, 2009. 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON 
*r 
/ ZACHARY E. PETERSON 
/ LINCOLN HARRIS 
iLttorneys for Respondent/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument 
was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this "V day of March, 2009, to the following: 
Jennifer Hedgcock 
6463 S. Coybrook Drive 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
William J. Middleton 
Guardian ad Litem 
Office of the Guardian ad Litem 
450 South State Street, #W22 
P. O. Box 140403 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0403 
G :\EDS I\DOCS\ 17798\0002\ND75 64. DOC 
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ADDENDUM 
AMENDED 
Protective Order 
Petitioner (protectedperson): 
Case Number: 084903296 
County: Salt Lake 
Judge: Peu l e r 
^District: 3rd 
State: Utah 
^l^y- Commissioner: Blomguist 
J e n n i f e r R. Hedgcock 
First Middle Last 
Address and phone # (to keep private, leave blank): 
6463 S. Coybrook Drive 
Street 
West J o r d a n , UT 84084 
Name 
Other people protected by this order 
Relationship 
to Petitioner Age 
City 
Phone #: 
State Zip 
Petitioner's attorney (if any): Steven H. Gunn 
Respondent (person Petitioner is protected from): Describe Respondent: 
Lee Evans Hedgcock 
Middle Last First 
Other names used; 
Relationship to Petitioner: e s t r a n g e d husband 
Address (street): 314 E. Park Creeke Lane 
S a l t Lake Ci ty UT 84115 
City State Zip 
1 Sex 
M 
Race 
Whi te 
Eyes 
Hazel 
Date of Birth 
7 /5 /1972 
Hair 
Brown 
Ht 
6 f l " 
Wt 
180 
Social Security # 
(only the last 4 numbers) 
0341 , 
Distinguishing features(like scars, tattoos, 
B a l d i n g 
limp, etc.) 
Driver's license issued by (State): Expires: 1 
Warning XXX Weapon involved (Box to be initialed by Court, if applicable) 
There were h e a r i n g s on 8 / 1 2 / 0 8 . The Respondent was given notice and an opportunity to be heard in 
the hearing that gave rise to this order. The following people were present at the hearings: 
El Petitioner QPetitioner's attorney (name): Steven H. Gunn 
B Respondent GFRespondent's attorney (name): L inco ln H a r r i s 
D Other (name) 
The Court reviewed the Request for Protective Order and: H received argument and evidence, • accepted the stipulation of 
the parties, D entered the default of the Respondent for failure to appear, finds that domestic violence or abuse has occurred or 
there is substantial likelihood of immediate danger of abuse or domestic violence by the Respondent, • finds that a minor 
child witnessed the abuse or domestic violence, and makes the orders initialed below. Utah Code 30-6-4.2 
The criminal orders on page 2 do not 
expire unless dismissed by the Court. 
The Court orders the Respondent to obey all orders initialed on 
this form and to not abuse or threaten to abuse anyone protected by this order. 
Warnings: 
• This is a court order. No one except the court can change it. If you do not obey this order, you can be arrested, 
fined, and face other charges. 
• This order is valid in all U.S. states and territories, the District of Columbia, and tribal lands. If you go to 
another U.S. state, territory or tribal land to violate this order, a federal judge can send you to prison. 
• No guns or firearms! (See page 2, item 5.) 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§2265, 2262, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) 
Protective Order 1 of 4 Approved by Board of District Court Judges, January 2006 
Revised. January 2007 
The Respondent must obey all orders initialed by the judicial officer. 
If you do not obey orders 1 - 6 below, the court can send you to jail for up to 1 year and order you to pay a fine. 
A second or subsequent violation can result in more severe penalties. 
(Violation of orders 1-6 below is a criminal Class A misdemeanor Utah Code §§ 30-6-4 2, 76-5-108, 77-36-1 1, 77-36-2 4) 
1 Personal Conduct Order 
Do not commit, try to commit or threaten to commit any form of violence against the Petitioner or any 
person listed on page 1 of this form. This includes stalking, harassing, threatening, physically hurting, or 
causing any other form of abuse. 
No Contact Order Do not ddikidtl phone, mail, e-mail, or communicate in any way with the 
Petitioner, either directly or indirectly^ excep t you may c o n t a c t he r by t e x t - m e s s a g i n g 
conce rn ing i s s u e s r e l a t i n g to the c h i l d r e n , i n c l u d i n g p a r e n t i n g - t i m e v i s i t s 
Contac t for Mediation ami p i c k - u p and d e l i v e r y of t h e c h i l d r e n . 
a l s o 
You are^allowed to have contact with the Petitioner ^rtfy/during mediation sessions for your divorce or 
custody case that are scheduled with a Court Qualified Mediator. 
Stay Away Order 
Stay away from: 
a. The Petitioner's current or future: S Vehicle S Job • School xjx] Home, premises and 
property (list current addresses below): 
Home address: 6463 S. Coybrook Dr ive - West J o r d a n , UT 84084 
Work address:. 11850 S. Election Road - Draper, UT 84020 
School address: 
Vehicle description: TOUF HyundaT~So~nata (SilverT 
• b. The school or childcare of the children listed on page 1 of this form. (List current 
School/Childcare addresses here): 
• c. Other (specify): 
No Guns or Other Weapons 
The Court finds that your use or possession of a weapon poses a serious threat of harm to the Petitioner. 
You cannot possess, have, or buy a gun or firearm or any of these weapons: 
See Utah Code 30-6-4 2(2)(d) 
Warning! It is a federal crime for you to have, possess, transport, ship, or receive any firearm or 
ammunition, including hunting weapons, while this protective order is in effect, even if 5 above is 
not initialed. 
Property Orders 
Unless a judicial officer makes a different order later, only the Petitioner can use, control and possess 
the following property and things, but cannot dispose of this property without court approval: 
• a. Home at (address) 
Protective Order 2 of 4 Approved by Board of District Court Judges, January 2006 
Revised January 2007 
• b. Car, truck or other property (describe) 
You must obey orders 7 — 12 initialed by the judge. If you do not, you will be in contempt of court and 
may be punished These orders will • expire • be reviewed by the court in days. 
9 
Property Orders Do not interfere with or change the Petitioner's phone, utility or other services. 
Child Custody & Parent-time Orders 
The Petitioner (the protected person) will have custody of the minor children listed below. The 
Petitioner may give a copy of this order to the principal or director of the child's school or daycare. If 
you do not obey the custody and parent-time orders listed here, the Petitioner may ask for the court's 
help (such as an order to show cause for contempt): 
You will have parent-time as follows: 
If there is a "No Contact" order, you can communicate with the Petitioner only about parent-time 
matters through: 
No Alcohol or Illegal Drugs Do not use alcohol or illegal drugs before or during visitation 
10 No Travel With Children Do not take the children listed above out of the state of Utah. 
11 Child Support, Spousal Support and other Expenses 
The Respondent will: 
• a. Pay $ / month in guidelines child support. 
• b. Have child support withheld from the Respondent's earnings. (Utah Code § 62A-11, Parts 4 and 5) 
• c. Pay $ / month in spousal support. 
• d. Pay 50% of the minor children's childcare expenses. 
• e. Pay 50% of the minor children's medical expenses, including premiums, deductibles and 
co-payments. 
D f. Pay $ for the minor children's medical expenses related to the abuse and 
$ for the Petitioner's medical expenses related to the abuse. 
12 Other A s s i s t a n c e N e e d e d (List below any other orders needed to protect you and other 
protected people listed on page 1 of this form) 
Orders to Agencies 
13 Law Enforcement to Assist A law enforcement officer from: 
will enforce the orders checked below: 
• a. Help the Petitioner gain and keep control over home, car or other personal belongings. 
Protective Order 3 of 4 Approved by Board of District Court Judges, January 2006 
Revised January 2007 
D b. Help the Petitioner obtain custody of the children. 
• c. Help the • Respondent or • Petitioner remove essential personal belongings from the home. 
Warning to the Respondent: Do not go into the home or other protected places without the officer., 
Law enforcement can evict you or keep you away from protected places, if needed. 
14 I I Investigate Possible Child Abuse 
This matter will be referred to the Division of Child and Family Services for review and possible 
investigation of child abuse. 
15. XX A guardian ad litem should be appointed for the divorce case. 
To t h e Petit ioner: In 2 years, the Respondent may ask the Court to dismiss the orders on this page. If 
that happens, we will need your address so the Court can give you notice. If your address changes, you must 
let the Court know at least 30 days before the 2-year period ends on / / . 
If you receive services from the Office of Recovery Services (ORS) and want to keep your address 
confidential, you must give ORS a copy of your current Protective Order. 
The Court fills out below 
Date: 
• 
Comm isSiomr (printed name) 
Date: 
>-
Judge (primedname) Sandra N. P e u l e r 
— The Respondent fi l ls out below — 
By signing here, the Respondent approves the form, and accepts service of this Protective Order and waives the 
right to be personally served. 
Respondent's Address 
Street City State Zip 
Respondent's Signature w_ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
L i n c o l i f i H a r r i s 
A t t o r n e y fo r Respondent 
Protective Order 4 of 4 Approved by Board of District Court Judges, January 2006 
Revised January 2007 
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Formerly cited as UT ST § 30-6-4 2 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B Judicial Code 
*i§ Chapter 7 Protective Orders 
*g Part 1 Cohabitant Abuse Act (Refs & Annos) 
-• § 78B-7-106. Protective orders-Ex parte protective orders -Modification of orders-Service of 
process—Duties of the court 
(1) If it appears from a petition for an order for protection or a petition to modify an order for protection that do-
mestic violence or abuse has occurred or a modification of an order for protection is required, a court may 
(a) without notice, immediately issue an order for protection ex parte or modify an order for protection ex 
parte as it considers necessary to protect the petitioner and all parties named to be protected in the petition, or 
(b) upon notice, issue an order for protection or modify an order after a hearing, whether or not the respondent 
appears 
(2) A court may grant the following relief without notice m an order for protection or a modification issued ex parte 
(a) enjoin the respondent from threatening to commit or committing domestic violence or abuse against the 
petitioner and any designated family or household member, 
(b) prohibit the respondent from harassing, telephoning, contacting, or otherwise communicating with the peti-
tioner, directly or indirectly, 
(c) order that the respondent is excluded from the petitioner's residence and its premises, and order the re-
spondent to stay away from the residence, school, or place of employment of the petitioner, and the premises 
of any of these, or any specified place frequented by the petitioner and any designated family or household 
member, 
(d) upon finding that the respondent's use or possession of a weapon may pose a serious threat of harm to the 
petitioner, prohibit the respondent from purchasing, using, or possessing a firearm or other weapon specified 
by the court, 
(e) order possession and use of an automobile and other essential personal effects, and direct the appropriate 
law enforcement officer to accompany the petitioner to the residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner 
is safely restored to possession of the residence, automobile, and other essential personal effects, or to super-
vise the petitioner's or respondent's removal of personal belongings, 
(f) grant to the petitioner temporary custody of any minor children of the parties, 
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(g) order the appointment of the office of the Guardian Ad Litem to represent the interests of any minor chil-
dren of the parties, if abuse or neglect of the minor children is alleged, or appoint a private guardian ad litem, 
if appropriate, pursuant to Section 78A-2-228, 
(h) order any further relief that the court considers necessary to provide for the safety and welfare of the peti-
tioner and any designated family or household member, and 
(I) if the petition requests child support or spousal support, at the hearing on the petition order both parties to 
provide verification of current income, including year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements of year-
to-date or other period of earnings, as specified by the court, and complete copies of tax returns from at least 
the most recent year 
(3) A court ma> grant the following relief in an order for protection or a modification of an order after notice 
and hearing, whether or not the respondent appears 
(a) grant the relief described in Subsection (2), and 
(b) specify arrangements for parent-time of any minor child by the respondent and require supervision of that 
parent-time by a third party or deny parent-time if necessary to protect the safety of the petitioner or child 
(4) Following the protective order hearing, the court shall 
(a) as soon as possible, deliver the order to the county sheriff for service of process, 
(b) make reasonable efforts to ensure that the order for protection is understood by the petitioner, and the re-
spondent, if present, 
(c) transmit, by the end of the next business day after the order is issued, a copy of the order for protection to 
the local law enforcement agency or agencies designated by the petitioner, and 
(d) transmit a copy of the order to the statewide domestic violence network described in Section 78B-7-113 
(5)(a) Each protective order shall include two separate portions, one for provisions, the violation of which are 
criminal offenses, and one for provisions, the violation of which are civil violations, as follows 
(l) criminal offenses are those under Subsections (2)(a) through (e), and under Subsection (3)(a) as it refers 
to Subsections (2)(a) through (e), and 
(a) civil offenses are those under Subsections (2)(f), (h), and (I), and Subsection (3)(a) as it refers to Sub-
sections (2)(f), (h), and (l) 
(b) The criminal provision portion shall include a statement that violation of any criminal provision is a class 
A misdemeanor 
(c) The civil provision portion shall include a notice that violation of or failure to comply with a civil provi-
sion is subject to contempt proceedings 
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(6) The protective order shall include: 
(a) a designation of a specific date, determined by the court, when the civil portion of the protective order 
either expires or is scheduled for review by the court, which date may not exceed 150 days after the date the 
order is issued, unless the court indicates on the record the reason for setting a date beyond 150 days; 
(b) information the petitioner is able to provide to facilitate identification of the respondent, such as Social Se-
curity number, driver license number, date of birth, address, telephone number, and physical description; and 
(c) a statement advising the petitioner that: 
(i) after two years from the date of issuance of the protective order, a hearing may be held to dismiss the 
criminal portion of the protective order; 
(ii) the petitioner should, within the 30 days prior to the end of the two-year period, advise the court of the 
petitioner's current address for notice of any hearing; and 
(iii) the address provided by the petitioner will not be made available to the respondent. 
(7) Child support and spouse support orders issued as part of a protective order are subject to mandatory income 
withholding under Title 62A, Chapter 11, Part 4, Income Withholding in IV-D Cases, and Title 62A, Chapter 11, 
Part 5, Income Withholding in Non IV-D Cases, except when the protective order is issued ex parte. 
(8)(a) The county sheriff that receives the order from the court, pursuant to Subsection (5)(a), shall provide ex-
pedited service for orders for protection issued in accordance with this chapter, and shall transmit verification of 
service of process, when the order has been served, to the statewide domestic violence network described in Sec-
tion 78B-7-113. 
(b) This section does not prohibit any law enforcement agency from providing service of process if that law 
enforcement agency: 
(i) has contact with the respondent and service by that law enforcement agency is possible; or 
(ii) determines that under the circumstances, providing service of process on the respondent is in the best in-
terests of the petitioner. 
(9)(a) When an order is served on a respondent in a jail or other holding facility, the law enforcement agency 
managing the facility shall make a reasonable effort to provide notice to the petitioner at the time the respondent 
is released from incarceration. 
(b) Notification of the petitioner shall consist of a good faith reasonable effort to provide notification, includ-
ing mailing a copy of the notification to the last-known address of the victim. 
(10) A court may modify or vacate an order of protection or any provisions in the order after notice and hearing, 
except that the criminal provisions of a protective order may not be vacated within two years of issuance unless 
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the petitioner 
(a) is personally served with notice of the hearing as provided in Rules 4 and 5, Utah Rules of Civil 
Piocedure, and the petitioner personally appears before the court and gives specific consent to the vacation of 
the criminal provisions of the protective order, or 
(b) submits a verified affidavit, stating agreement to the vacation of the criminal provisions of the protective order 
(11) A protective order may be modified without a showing of substantial and material change in circumstances 
(12) Insofar as the provisions of this chapter are more specific than the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, regarding 
protective orders, the provisions of this chapter govern 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008, c 3, § 1103, etf Feb 7, 2008, Laws 2008, c 163, § 1, eff May 5, 2008 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2008, c 163, § 1, inserted subsec (2)(g), redesignated subsecs (2)(g) and (2)(h) as subsecs (2)(h) and 
(2)(i), and in subsec (5)(a)(n), twice substituted "(2)(f), (h), and (l), and" for "(2)0) through (h) and" 
Composite section by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel of Laws 2008, c 3, § 1103 and 
Laws 2008, c 163, § 1 
Prior Laws 
Laws 1995, c 300, §7 
Laws 1996, c 244, §5 
Laws 1997, c 10, § 35 
Laws 2001, c 255, § 16 
Laws 2003, c 68, § 4 
Laws 2005, c 156, § 1 
C 1953, §30-6-4 2 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Attempt, elements and classification, see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102 
Conspiracy and solicitation, elements and penalties, see § 76-4-201 et seq 
Fines upon conviction of misdemeanor or felony, see § 76-3-301 
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Inchoate offenses, limitations on sentencing, see §§ 76-4-301 and 76-4-302 
Penalties for misdemeanors, see § 76-3-204 
Protective orders pertaining to discovery, see Rules Civ Proc , Rule 26 
Protective orders, sanctions, see Rules Civ Proc , Rule 37 
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES 
Stalkers and firearms A dangerous mix, Utah's civil stalking injunction statute Monica Maio, 7 J L & Fam 
Stud 263 (2005) 
State v Hai dy Reading between the lines Why love letters may amount to veiled threats when sent by an abus-
ive spouse Ta)ha Lee Cedeiholm, 6 J L & Fam Stud 139(2004) 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Breach ot the Peace € ^ > 16, 20 
Westlaw Key Number Searches 62k 16, 62k20 
C J S Breach of the Peace ^ 14, 18 to 19, 21, 25 
C J S Domestic Abuse and Violence §§ 2 to 4, 6 to 14, 18 to 21, 23 
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED 
Violence against women prevention, interstate stalking, see 18 U S C A § 2261A 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
Effect of guilty plea 2 
Sufficiency of evidence 3 
Validity 1 
1 Validity 
Statutes governing orders for protection and criminal penalty for violations were not unconstitutionally over-
broad by prohibiting innocent speech by defendant directed at wife who obtained order for protection, in light of 
state's interest in preserving the wife's health and well-being, and court's ability to apply statutes only after it 
found that defendant and wife were cohabitants and that wife had been victim of domestic abuse U C A 1953, 
30-6-4 2(2)(b), 76-5-108 State v Hardy 2002 54 P 3d 645, 452 Utah Adv Rep 3, 2002 UT App 244 Breach 
Of The Peace €=^> 15 1, Constitutional Law €^> 90 1(1) 
2 Effect of guilty plea 
By pleading guilty to misdemeanor count of violation of order for protection, defendant admitted all essential 
elements of offense, and thus, waived challenge to constitutionality of statute governing offense U C A 1953, 
30-6-4 2(2)(b) State v Hardy, 2002, 54 P 3d 645, 452 Utah Adv Rep 3, 2002 UT App 244 Criminal Law €^> 
273 3, Criminal Law €^> 273 4(1) 
3 Sufficiency of evidence 
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Evidence that defendant wrote letters and mailed them to wife's home was sufficient to demonstrate that defend-
ant was contacting wife, in violation of order for protection, even though letters were addressed to children, 
reading skills of two children who were old enough to read were rudimentary, and letters contained information 
regarding marital relationship with wife UCA 1953, 30-6-4 2(2)(b) State v Hardy, 2002, 54 P 3d 645, 452 
Utah Adv Rep 3, 2002 UT App 244 Breach Of The Peace € ^ > 15 1 
UCA 1953 § 78B-7-106, UT ST § 78B-7-106 
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c 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 30-6-4.3 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
*ti Chapter 7. Protective Orders 
*Ial Part 1. Cohabitant Abuse Act (Refs & Annos) 
-• § 78B-7-107. Hearings on ex parte orders 
(l)(a) When a court issues an ex parte protective order the court shall set a date for a hearing on the petition 
within 20 days after the ex parte order is issued. 
(b) If at that hearing the court does not issue a protective order, the ex parte protective order shall expire, un-
less it is otherwise extended by the court. Extensions beyond the 20-day period may not by granted unless: 
(i) the petitioner is unable to be present at the hearing; 
(ii) the respondent has not been served; 
(iii) the respondent has had the opportunity to present a defense at the hearing; 
(iv) the respondent requests that the ex parte order be extended; or 
(v) exigent circumstances exist. 
(c) Under no circumstances may an ex parte order be extended beyond 180 days from the date of initial issu- ance. 
(d) If at that hearing the court issues a protective order, the ex parte protective order remains in effect until 
service of process of the protective order is completed. 
(e) A protective order issued after notice and a hearing is effective until further order of the court. 
(f) If the hearing on the petition is heard by a commissioner, either the petitioner or respondent may file an ob-
jection within ten days of the entry of the recommended order and the assigned judge shall hold a hearing 
within 20 days of the filing of the objection. 
(2) Upon a hearing under this section, the court may grant any of the relief described in Section 78B-7-106. 
(3) When a court denies a petition for an ex parte protective order or a petition to modify an order for protection 
ex parte, the court shall set the matter for hearing upon notice to the respondent. 
(4) A respondent who has been served with an ex parte protective order may seek to vacate the ex parte protect-
ive order prior to the hearing scheduled pursuant to Subsection (l)(a) by filing a verified motion to vacate. The 
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respondent's verified motion to vacate and a notice of hearing on that motion shall be personally served on the 
petitioner at least two days prior to the hearing on the motion to vacate 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008, c 3, § 1104, eft Feb 7, 2008, Laws 2008, c 163, § 2, eff May 5, 2008 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2008, c 163, § 2, rewrote subsec (l)(b), added subsec (l)(c), and redesignated subsecs (l)(c) to (l)(e) as 
subsecs (1 )(d) to (1 )(f) Subsection (1 )(b) formerly read 
"(b) If at that hearing the court does not issue a protective order, the ex parte protective ordei shall expire, unless 
it is otherwise extended by the court " 
Composite section by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel of Laws 2008, c 3, § 1104 and 
Laws 2008, c 163, § 2 
Prior Laws 
Laws 1995, c 300, § 8 
Laws 1998, c 83, § 1 
Laws 2001, c 247, § 1 
C 1953, § 30-6-4 3 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Breach of the Peace C^> 20 
Westlaw Key Number Search 62k20 
C J S Breach of the Peace §§ 14, 18 to 19, 21, 25 
C J S Domestic Abuse and Violence §^ 2 to 3, 7 to 14, 18 to 21, 23 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
In general 1 
1 In general 
Respondent was not wrongfully denied hearing before judge on petition for protection order, respondent could 
have filed objection to court commissioner's recommendation, which would have required judge to conduct 
hearing within 20 days, but failed to do so Buck v Robinson, 2008, 177 P 3d 648, 596 Utah Adv Rep 15, 2008 
UTApp28 Breach Of The Peace €^> 20 
Defendant violated a protective order when he broke into his estranged wife's home, though defendant had not 
been served with permanent protective order, as defendant had notice of the hearing at which the permanent pro-
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tective order was issued, so that court's prior ex parte protective order remained in effect until the permanent or-
der was served UCA 1953, 30-6-4 3(c), UCA 1953, 76-5-108 (1994), UCA 1953, 30-6-5(6) (Repealed) 
State v Rudolph, 1998, 970 P 2d 1221, 349 Utah Adv Rep 11, rehearing denied, dismissal of habeas corpus re-
versed 208 F 3d 227, on remand 2000 WL 33407004, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed 43 P 3d 467, 439 
Utah Adv Rep 8, 2002 UT 7, dismissal of habeas corpus affirmed 111 Fed Appx 56 \ 2004 WL 2166171, cer-
tiorari denied 125 S Ct 1593, 544 U S 906, 161 L Ed 2d 281 Breach Of The Peace € ^ > 15 1 
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